BY PETER WANYONYI
It wasn’t supposed to end like this. South Sudan, Africa’s youngest state, was supposed to be the one country that would not succumb to the painful realities of post-independence Africa – the reasoning as that Juba would have seen the pitfalls that befell the rest of Africa and would have learnt from them, and would be too wise to get embroiled in the madness that passes for governance in Africa. For good measure, South Sudanese returned to the country from all over the world, many of them smart, well-educated young professionals eager to build the types of societies they had seen abroad, minus the negative points they had experienced, in their blessed country.
And how blessed it is. Few African countries outside of South Africa have the sort of natural endowments that South Sudan was bequeathed with. Gold, petroleum, iron ore, copper, chromium ore, zinc, tungsten, mica, silver, and timber are to be found in plenty across the country. Well-watered farmland, virtually all of it virgin and untouched, stretches in all directions within Juba’s borders. The many tributaries of the Nile originating in the country ensure that hydropower potential is immense, and a young and robust population means there are many hands willing to work this land and bring forth development for the country.
At least that was the hope when the country became independent of the Arab north in July 2011. But the optimism that independence brought was quickly overshadowed by a creeping pessimism – for one, South Sudan seemed unconcerned about actually delivering any services to its people. Inheriting a country long-neglected by the Arab north, Juba’s new government was saddled with massive expectations and was sure to disappoint.
However, even modest attempts at changing the situation for its people would have been seen as massive successes. This did not happen, as the new government of President Salva Kiir quickly got involved in monumental corruption. The petroleum economy of Juba was always going to be susceptible to graft, but the levels of larceny within government circles were – even by African standards – astonishing.
The situation was made worse when, amid escalating distrust and competition for lucrative oil and government contracts, Kiir sacked his deputy president, Dr Riek Machar. Like most African countries, South Sudan is a patchwork of rival ethnicities, and Machar’s Nuer community are traditional rivals of Kiir’s dominant Dinka community. The Nuer interpreted the sacking of Machar as an attempt to exclude them from the lucrative Juba gravy train – which it was. Fighting, which had been happening sporadically as individuals and gangs competed over land and other resources, took on an ominous tribal dimension. Dinka militias massacred Nuers, and Nuer rebels revenged by massacring ethnic Dinkas. The sacking of Machar had led to the most feared scenario in Africa – the opening of tribal gates of hell.
South Sudan has staggered from peace talks to peace deals over the last three years, but it was obvious that there wasn’t real political will on either the rebel side or the government side to reach a ceasefire. Machar was reappointed deputy president, but his role had been stripped of most important functions and was a position in name only – he had zero power. Negotiations to mitigate this fell apart, Kiir and his Dinka clique hardened their position, and fighting escalated.
It was against this background that world oil prices collapsed suddenly. Unable to make much money from oil, Juba rapidly fell behind on salary payments to soldiers and civil servants, and government officials quickly looted the central bank of the few dollars left in its accounts. The IMF sent in a financial rescue package of $ 140 million in June 2015 – most of the money disappeared into the personal accounts of government officials.
The breaking point came in June 2016. By then, the government in Juba was completely broke, and had been unable to pay salaries for four months. Government accounts at the central bank were empty, and the government overdrew its own accounts and credited banks with enough money to pay government workers salaries for two months. But that was not even the worst of it: by then, army soldiers had not been paid since January 2016.
Most had turned into thugs, hijacking foreign workers and extorting ransoms to set them free. The government in Juba grabbed – through the Central Bank – nearly $300 million in customer deposits, as commercial banks are obliged to deposit dollars with the central bank. The chances of that money being repaid are nil. Companies and banks needing US dollars are forced to physically import the money from Kenya. But security limitations mean that they cannot import as much as they need to carry out day to day operations. On July 10 2016, open civil war broke out in South Sudan.
Naturally, foreign investors in the country have panicked – at the time of writing this article, at least two Kenyan banks were on the verge of closing down their operations in the country. All roads into and out of Juba had been closed, flights into and out of the country had ceased. This was followed by a hushed-up diplomatic incident on the night of July 7 – 8, when a US Diplomatic Toyota LandCruiser carrying American diplomats was attacked by Juba government soldiers, and was sprayed with automatic gunfire. The diplomats survived only because the vehicle was armoured. Some foreigners were at the time of writing living in secured locations around Juba, unable to venture outside without armed UN escorts, and wondering when their governments would send in flights to pick them up.
South Sudan has failed as a state before it even got started.
So what to do about it? South Sudanese are clearly their own worst enemies, and it is obvious that South Sudan will become a danger to its neighbours – small arms originating from Juba are finding their way into criminal hands as government soldiers sell army-issue weapons to survive. It is obvious that, left to their own devices, the South Sudanese will simply collapse into a genocidal civil war, one that will have devastating consequences for their people and for regional security as refugees stream into neighbouring countries to escape the fighting.
Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda will host the vast majority of those refugees, and it is from them that a solution must be found. Kenya is the biggest investor in South Sudan, Uganda is Juba’s military benefactor, and Ethiopia is the regional military big boy. These three must combine and raise a military force that is sent into South Sudan to not just impose peace, but also to run the country. Salva Kiir and his henchmen have failed to run South Sudan equitably, and it would make no sense to leave him in charge while trying to keep the peace. Kiir and Machar must be exiled from South Sudan for the good of the country, and stability must be forced upon Juba by military might.
After a stabilisation period, UN-supervised elections can take place and a government of national unity can be formed to chart the way for a new South Sudan. This is perhaps the most acceptable manner to restore sanity to the warring tribes of South Sudan – the alternative is to look on as a genocide unfolds in a country that is blessed beyond measure with untold resources but cursed beyond belief with human foibles.
